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more involved with the private law than with the political debate. Under this law arises the question of how to treat those
bodies of water classified as arms of the sea, such as Lake Pontchartrain, 41 to which heretofore the rule of accretion has not
applied. There is also the question of what effect the new rule
has on the French and Spanish land grants confirmed by Congress. It probably will have no effect since it has been held that
the nature of such a confirmation is that of a quitclaim deed be42
cause title never vested in the United States.
If the rule of Hughes is extended to include patents issued
after statehood and applied to Louisiana, it would greatly affect
Louisiana property. law. Such an application would oppose the
basic policy of the law which seeks security and stability of titles.
The only persons who would gain by such a drastic change in the
law are the littoral proprietors, but the result would be a great
expense to Louisiana taxpayers. Even though the Court has recently said, "Whether latent federal power should be exercised
' 43
to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,
the decision of Hughes suggests that the Court views the type of
rule found in Louisiana as unfair, and in all probabilities will
change it insofar as it relates to federal patents.
P. Michael Hebert

GOOD FAITH FOR PURPOSES OF AcQuIsITIvE PREscRIPTION
IN LOUISIANA AND FRANCE
Ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables in Louisiana is regulated by Civil Code articles 3478-3482. These articles
require that the adverse possessor be in good faith. As defined
by article 3451, the good faith possessor is he "who has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing which he possesses,
although he may not be in fact."' Conversely, as defined by
41. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
42. Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478 (1865).
43. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)
(mineral leases).

1. Article 503 defines the bona fide possessor for purposes of determining the ownership of fruits of an immovable. "He is a bona fide possessor
who possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms to transfer
property, the defects of which he was ignorant of." This definition is
consistent with that of article 3451. The courts have construed the two
definitions in part materia. Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 758, 152 So. 513,
516 (1934).
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article 3452, the possessor in bad faith is he "who possesses as
master, but who assumes this quality, when he well knows
that he has no title to the thing, or that his title is vicious and
defective." Article 3481 provides that "good faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he who alleges bad faith
in the possessor, must prove it."
The Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence in Louisiana has adopted a very conservative attitude toward possessors claiming to be in good faith.
This attitude is largely a result of two related factors: First, the
courts have held that paragraph 3 of article 1846 precludes good
faith in any case in which there is an error of law. A distinction
has, therefore, arisen between moral and legal good faith.
"The third paragraph of Article 1846 of the Civil Code
reads as follows: 'Error of law can never be alleged as a
means of acquiring, though it may be invoked as the means
of preventing loss or of recovering what has been given or
paid under such error. The error, under which a possessor
may be as to the legality of his title, shall not give him a
right to prescribe under it.'
"For over one hundred years the courts of this state when
construing the Articles of the Civil Code relative to good
faith possessors have accorded to this paragraph the influence it was designed to have. It has uniformly been held
that regardless of the moral good faith of the purchaser, if
he purchased and possessed under error of law, he thereby
became a possessor in bad faith and prescription was not
available to him. It is not sufficient always to characterize
a possessor as being in good faith simply because he thinks
or believes he is acquiring good title. '2 (Emphasis added.)
Second, the courts have held that in many situations a purchaser
is under a duty to determine the facts relative to his vendor's
title. Doubt on the part of a purchaser concerning the vendor's
title has been held to be inconsistent with good faith. 8 If a
purchaser is aware of any fact which the court feels should
raise doubt about his vendor's title, he will be held under a duty
to resolve that doubt-"to pursue every lead and ferret out all
the facts to the end that he may not purchase until he has
2. Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So.2d 68, 71 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
3. Knight v. Berwick Lumber Co., 130 La. 233, 57 So. 900 (1912).
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complete information before him."'4 The courts have therefore
greatly limited the circumstances in which a purchaser may
successfully claim error of fact.
The significance of this duty to investigate must be understood in relation to two additional doctrines established by the
jurisprudence. First, knowledge obtained by an attorney for
the benefit of his client is imputed to the client.5 A mistake by
an attorney in evaluating the information at his disposal therefore precludes the possibility of legal good faith on the part of
his client. Second, a complete knowledge of the records is
imputed to the purchaser who undertakes a title search., Thus,
an attorney who limits his title search to a certain number of
years may, if there is a defect in title which would be revealed
by a thorough search, leave his client in a worse position than
if no search had been made, for, as a result of the limited search,
the client will lose his claim to good faith.
Since any suit based on ten-year acquisitive prescription
necessarily arises long after the purchase in question was made,
the practical issue in appraising good faith is whether the purchaser should have doubted his vendor's title from the facts
he then knew. The answer of the jurisprudence to this question
is not complete because the possible fact situations in this area
are innumerable, but the general attitude of the jurisprudence
4. Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 352, 123 So.2d 79, 83 (1960); Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So.2d 68, 71 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). See also Blunson v.
Knighton, 140 So. 302, 307 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932): "One is not a possessor
in good faith who has cause to inquire and fails to avail himself of the
means and facilities at hand to inform himself of the true facts and yet
acted at his peril." This position was specifically adopted In Harrill v. Pitts,
194 La. 123, 142, 193 So. 562, 568 (1940).
5. Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 183, 81 So.2d
852, 854 (1955). In this case the knowledge of a corporation's attorneys
was imputed to the corporation. The weight of the cases is decidedly to
the effect that error on the part of the lawyer is imputed to the client. See
the discussion of title examinations in Johnson, Good Faith as a Condition
of Ten Year Acquisitive Prescription,34 TUL. L. REv. 671, 679, 680 (1960),
and cases cited nn. 38 and 39 therein. This article cites practically every
case ever decided on ten-year prescription. A few cases have indicated that
the attorney's failure to discover existing defects may not relegate the client
to bad faith. Nethery v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 175 La. 753, 144
So. 486 (1932); Savoia v. Capello, 119 So.2d 113 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
6. Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So.2d 852
(1955), quoted in Holley v. Lockett, 126 So.2d 814, 818 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961):
"[A vendee] may purchase without any investigation of title and yet be
protected by the prescription of ten years . . . . however if, instead of
relying on the faith of his vendor's title, he institutes an investigation into
its validity, he is then bound by what the record reveals and cannot
claim to be in good faith if the record discloses a defect in the title of
his vendor."
7. Land Development Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 10, 124 So. 125, 128
(1929): "[T]he question of good faith on the part of the person pleading
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is clear. The courts often hold that a mere possibility of title
defect suggested by the purchaser's deed, the records if they
were searched, or the purchaser's private knowledge should have
raised a sufficient doubt to require a thorough investigation of
all matters relating to the title both within and without the
records.
In Bel v. Manuel,8 the deed on which plaintiff relied stated
that the vendors were selling "'All of our individed [sic] interest' in and to [description omitted], it being provided that 'The
interest hereby conveyed being the interest inherited by us
from our deceased mother, Olive Ortego, wife of Joachim Fontenot, now both deceased.' "I The court held that this language
''was ample to place a reasonable person on notice that the
interest being transferred did not include the entire property."'1
In Arnold v. Sun Oil Co.," the court held that a recorded heirship affidavit listing four children of the deceased but stating
that the only remaining heirs of the deceased were one child
and two grandchildren born to one of the deceased children,
contained sufficient information to create a "duty under the law
to make a complete and exhaustive investigation to determine
whether" more than one of the original four was alive or whether
more than one, though dead, had descendants. 12 The court in
Boyet v. Perryman'8 held that a deed containing a reference to
a judgment of possession for a description of the property
being conveyed should have put plaintiffs on their guard to make
inquiry in the records. The court not only required plaintiffs to
turn to the judgment of possession but also fully to investigate
the title of the deceased. The court reasoned that plaintiffs should
have known that the judgment of possession could place the
heirs in possession of only what the deceased actually owned. 14
the prescription of 10 years is always a question of fact to be determined
by the circumstances of the particular case." It has been definitely established that quit claims and deeds without warranty may serve as the basis
for ten year prescription-though they show the doubt at least of the vendor
about the title. The court in Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co.,
213 La. 588, 603 n.2, 35 So.2d 225, 231 n.2 (1948), admitted the lack of
uniformity of the prior jurisprudence but concluded that the matter was no
longer open to question. As to when tax sales or judicial sales may be the
basis of just title see Comment, Just Title in Prescription of Immovables,
15 TUL. L. REV. 436 (1941).

8. 234 La. 135, 99 So.2d 58 (1958).
9. Id. at 138, 99 So.2d at 60.
10. Id. at 142, 99 So.2d at 61.
11. 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1950).
12. Id. at 66-67, 48 So.2d at 374-75.
13. 240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960).
14. Id. at 352, 123 So.2d at 83.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

The reasoning in this case is particularly questionable. In the
sense that a vendee, like an heir, can receive only the title his
predecessor owned, a judgment of possession is no different from
an ordinary sale. If a court requires a possessor to check his
vendor's title because the possessor could not receive more than
the predecessor owned, it will have to require checking of every
title.
The preclusion of good faith when there has been error of
law is integrally related to the stringency of the judicial requirement that an investigation be made. If it were not for this
preclusion, a purchaser could simply claim that because he did
not draw all the legal implications from the facts he knew,
no doubt about his vendor's title was raised in his estimation
which would place him under any duty to investigate. This relation between the preclusion of good faith under error of law
and the consequent limitation of the situations in which error
of fact can be claimed is shown particularly by Juneau v.
Laborde15 and Dinwiddie v. Cox.' 6 In Juneau, a purchaser, well
informed of the family history of his vendor's immediate predecessor in title, knew that the predecessor's wife had died and
that there were children of the marriage. The purchaser was
held to be in bad faith since he was bound by the legal conclusion that these children might have had an interest in the
property. In Dinwiddie, a purchaser was held to be in bad faith
because he knew his vendor, who was selling inherited property,
was not an only child. Though the purchaser knew that his
vendor had no living brother or sister, he was held to the legal
conclusion that there might be issue of the deceased heirs who
would inherit in their parent's stead.1 Rather than permitting
the purchaser to accept his vendor's assertion of full ownership, the court, as in Juneau, required a thorough investigation.
An Analysis of Article 1846
The heart of the ten-year good faith prescription problem
in Louisiana is the judicial construction of paragraph 3 of article
1846.18 As stated previously, the courts have held that the pro15. 219 La. 921, 54 So.2d 325 (1951).
16. 9 So.2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
17. Id. at 72.
18. Art. 1846: "Error in law, as well as error in fact, invalidates a contract, where such error is its only or principal cause, subject to the following
modifications and restrictions:
"1. Although the party may have been ignorant of his right, yet if
the contract, made under such error, fulfilled any such natural obligation
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hibition against alleging error of law to support acquisition
means that good faith cannot be alleged in order to acquire
under ten-year prescription in cases when that good faith is
based on error of law. This judicial construction extends article
1846 beyond its proper sphere. All that the article purports to
regulate is the rights of parties to a contract. The judicial construction of paragraph 3 causes that paragraph to become a
rule about acquisitive prescription in terms of the rights of record
owners rather than a rule about acquisitive prescription in terms
of the rights of parties in privity. If this were the proper construction, it is strange indeed that the paragraph was not placed
in the section of the Code regulating prescription but rather was
placed in a section of the Code regulating contracts. None
of the other paragraphs of the article could possibly be construed
to affect and preserve the rights of parties not in privity. There
is no reason to believe paragraph 3 should be so construed. Admittedly, the paragraph is something of an anomaly among the
other paragraphs of the article. The article sets out the general
rule that contracts may be invalidated because of error of
law. The paragraphs, except paragraph 3, state exceptions to
this rule and give circumstances in which contracts may not
be invalidated though made under error of law. Paragraph 3
provides instead that a contract may be confirmed by the party
under error of law if confirming that contract would allow him
to prescribe under it. The paragraph simply means that a vendee may not prescribe against his vendor when there is a vice
in the contract of transfer between them and when the vendee
as might from its nature induce a presumption that it was made in consequence of the obligation, and not from error of right, then such error
shall not be alleged to avoid the contract. Thus, the natural obligation to

perform the will of the donor, prevents the donee from reclaiming legacies
or gifts he has paid under a testament void only for want of form.
"2. A contract, made for the purpose of avoiding litigation, can not
be rescinded for error of law.

"3. Error of law can never be alleged as the means of acquiring, though
it may be invoked as the means of preventing loss or of recovering what
has been given or paid under such error. The error, under which a possessor
may be as to the legality of his title, shall not give him a right to prescribe
under it.
"4. A judicial confession of a debt shall not be avoided by an allega-

tion of error of law, though it may be by showing an error of fact.
"5. A promise or contract, that destroys a prescriptive right, shall not
be avoided by an allegation that the party was ignorant or in an error
with regard to the law of prescription.

"6. If

a party has an exception, that destroys the natural as well

as the perfect obligation, and, through error of law, makes a promise or
contract that destroys such exception, he may avail himself of such error;

but if the exception destroys only the perfect, but not the natural obligation,
error of law shall not avail to restore the exception."
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should have been able to determine the vice from the facts he
knew at the time of the transaction.
To the limited extent of the requirements of just title set
out by articles 3484-3486, the rights of third parties-record
owners-are affected, however, by the contractual relation between the possessor and his vendor. Article 3485 defines just title
as a "title which by its nature, would have been sufficient to
transfer the ownership of the property, provided it had been
derived from the real owners, such as a sale, exchange, legacy, or
donation." Assuming that this provision means that any defect
preventing transfer of ownership from vendor to possessor is
sufficient to defeat just title, article 1846, since it prevents a
vendee from acquiring ownership from his vendor by alleging
error of law, would extend the meaning of just title. For example,
a purchaser could not base his prescription against a third party
on just title if he bought from a minor, knowing the minor's
age, but being under error of law as to his incapacity. This would
follow regardless of whether information about the minor's age
appeared in the title instrument for, despite its absence, there
would remain a defect in the title by which the purchaser had
acquired. A preferable construction of article 3485 is, however,
that its purpose is only to require that the title be of the sort
which transfers ownership ("a sale, exchange, legacy, or donation" as opposed, for instance, to a lease or partition) and that
the article has no application to other defects preventing transfer
of ownership 9 such as, perhaps, the minority of the vendor.
Under this construction, the provisions of article 1846 preventing acquisitive prescription by a possessor against his own vendor
in the case of a vice of title due to error of law would, of course,
have no effect on just title under article 3485.20
19. This view is consistent with the jurisprudence. Though most of
the cases involving just title have construed article 3486 (relating to defects
of form) rather than article 3485, the policy of the jurisprudence to decide
the matter of just title solely on the basis of what appears on the face
of the title instrument is clear. See Comment, Just Title in the Prescription
of Immovables, 15 TuL. L, REV. 436 (1941). See Pattison v. Maloney, 38 La.

Ann. 885 (1886); Clayton v. Rickerson, 160 La. 771, 107 So. 569 (1926).
20. In an unpublished Memorandum Concerning Good Faith Prescription, Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos has presented a very similar view. He
too argues that paragraph 3 of article 1846 has nothing to do with good

faith and that, if it is to affect acquisitive prescription at all, the effect
should be in

its regulation

of just title. He points out that the French

text of paragraph 3 reads vice de son titre for the English "legality of his
title" and that the phrase vice do son titre immediately suggests a regulation of just title, not good faith.
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The French Sources and the Intentions of the Redactors
The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code state that article
21
1846 was derived from the treatises of Pothier and Domat.
Pothier, in his Trait6 de la prescription,makes a very broad statement concerning error of law which seems to support the position of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
"My opinion, founded on error of law, that another has
transferred an immovable to me is not a just opinion, and,
as a result, it does not have the quality of good faith neces'22
sary for prescription.
Domat's discussion, on the other hand, does not lend itself to
such a broad interpretation. At the section of his treatise to
which the redactors refer, he speaks of error of law in terms
of its effect on specific contracts-just as our article does. 23 Discussing when contracts may or may not be avoided because
of error of law, he writes:
"If by error or ignorance of law a person is prejudiced and
this situation cannot be remedied without prejudicing the
rights of another, this error will change nothing to the
4
prejudice of the other."2
Domat gives no example of the operation of this principle upon
acquisitive prescription. Since, however, he sets forth the principle in a section treating of the rights of parties to a contract,
it is doubtful that he expected it to affect good faith and so to
preserve the rights of parties not in privity. Though Pothier's
statement of the principle is broad enough to be so construed,
the example he gives of its operation indicates that he too was
thinking of the rights of the immediate parties to a given
contract.
"Take, for example, a case in which your agent, to whom
you have given procuration to administer your goods, believes
by error of law that this procuration gave him the right to
sell your immovables, and in which, by virtue of this procuration, your agent does sell an immovable to another who
was under the same error. This acquirer cannot acquire by
prescription because his opinion that the property had been
21. 1

LOUISIANA

LEGAL ARCHIVES,

PROJET OF THE

CIVIL CODE

OF 1825,

(1937).
22. 9 POTHIER, OEUVRES 328 (2d ed. 1861) (transl. by author).
23. 1 J. DOMAT, OETUVRES 386 (Nouvelle ed. 1828).

24. Id. (transl. by author).

241
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transferred to him was founded on error of law and so was
not a just opinion and did not therefore partake of that
25
quality of good faith necessary for prescription. '
Pothier apparently believed that error of law precludes good
faith. Nevertheless, the example which he gives of the application of his principle indicates that he had not considered the
application beyond its regulation of the relationship between
a given vendee and his vendor. Whatever Pothier's opinion,
the French jurisprudence and more recent commentators have
rejected it because they found it inconsistent with the spirit of
the articles on prescription, 26 especially the presumption of good
faith. A purchaser in France can prescribe even against his own
vendor when he purchased under error of law as to the validity
of the title between them. 7 The views of Pothier and Domat,
have, to a certain extent, been perpetuated in our Code by article
1846, which in the French Civil Code is significantly absent.
However, we in Louisiana should not feel bound by the broadest
possible construction of paragraph 3 of the article when those
from whom our redactors derived the principle apparently did
not foresee its broadest application but rather viewed it as
regulating the rights of parties to a contract of transfer.
Not only is article 1846 without a counterpart in the French
Civil Code, but articles 3451 and 3484 have no counterparts in
the French Civil Code. Article 3451, defining good faith, requires
only that the possessor have just reason to "believe himself the
master of the thing he possesses." The article further states
that this just reason is present when "a possessor buys a thing
which he supposes to belong to the person selling it to him,
but which in fact, belongs to another." Though article 3484
relates to just title, it too reflects the spirit of the legislation with
regard to good faith. It provides that a just title must be a
title which the possessor received from a "person whom he
honestly believed to be the real owner." It is hard to believe
that these articles placing such emphasis upon honest belief, i.e.,
moral good faith, were written with the intention that a distinction between legal and moral good faith should eventually deny
the independent sufficiency of this honest belief.
25. 9 POTHIER, OEUVRES 328 (2d ed. 1861) (transl. by author).
26. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS (AN
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 218 (1966).

ENGLISH

TRANSLATION

BY

27. Id. But due to article 1846(3), a Louisiana purchaser could not prescribe against his vendor in such a case. This is the only difference which

article 1846(3) should be held to create between Louisiana and French law.
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The Policy Issues and the Administrative Question

The ten-year prescription is designed to protect from eviction
one who has possessed an immovable for ten years and who for
just reason believed at the time of the commencement of possession that he was the master of the thing possessed. The prescription is also designed to quiet titles and keep property in
commerce. Both purposes are defeated by the distinction between moral and legal good faith and the resulting conservatism of the jurisprudence. A great many of the cases involving
ten-year prescription arise when oil has been discovered on certain property. The presence of oil makes it monetarily feasible
to make a careful search of the records and to determine passage of title for generations. Then, frequently, a person who was
unaware of having any title to the given tract of land is contacted for a lease and the litigation begins.
The interests of the record owner must be considered as
well, though they are protected in several ways. The courts have
required substantial acts of possession on the part of a person
seeking to prescribe. 28 The record owner need only inspect his
property once every ten years, a long time in our fast moving
world. Today, the purchaser who buys without any check of
title is the exception. As the complexity of our land law increases,
especially in the area of tax sales, error of law rather than
error of fact is to become more prevalent. It has been pointed
out that a purchaser is now caught between two fires. 29 If he
purchases without making a title inspection, he takes his chances.
But, if he makes an inspection and fails to discover all relevant
facts or makes an error of law, he loses his claim to good faith.
The question of whether a possessor is in good faith is
always, at least in part, subjective. But a court cannot read a
possessor's mind so it must decide whether the possessor really
believes himself "the master of the thing he possesses" on the
facts before it. The present policy of refusing to permit a pos28. Nixon v. English, 207 La. 906, 22 So.2d 266 (1945); Martel v. Hunt,
195 La. 701, 197 So. 402 (1940). One significant failure in this protection has
been created by the holding in Zeringue v. Blouin, 192 So.2d 838 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1967). Under the construction of articles 3437 and 3498 given in this
case, a possessor might purchase a tract which was actually divided Into
several parts, each owned by a different person. If he occupied part of the
tract, his constructive possession would extend to the extent of his title.
There might be no corporeal possession on the land of a given true owner.
See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 TermPrescription,p. 326 infra.
29. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 TermPrescription,13 LA. L. REV. 262, 265 (1953).
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sessor to claim error of law simplifies the court's job considerably because the court does not have to decide whether a possessor made an error of law and consequently believed in his
title or knew his title to be defective. Determining the facts a
person knows or should know is much easier than determining
what conclusions the person actually drew from the facts.
Moreover, the policy of requiring the possessor to be aware of
any possible defect in title raised by the facts further simplifies
and makes objective the area for judicial determination. The
courts do not have to determine all that the possessor knew, only
that he had knowledge sufficient to raise a possibility of defect.
It is the very fact, however, that courts cannot determine
what goes on in a man's mind that makes a presumption of good
faith necessary. This presumption of good faith, moreover, is
much more consistent with a system permitting error of law, for,
as the Louisiana experience indicates, a system which does not
permit error of law can establish requirements sufficiently strict
and objective that a presumption of good faith becomes no longer
meaningful.
If legislative action or judicial reappraisal of article 1846
permitting error of law in ten-year prescription were to occur,
the problem of how the courts would determine what goes on in
a possessor's mind would become acute. Certain objective standards, hopefully much different from those at present, would
have to be developed. A purchaser certainly could not be permitted to claim error of law in flagrant circumstances. For
example, he could not be permitted to assert that he thought he
had purchased a tract from the true owner when another had
previously been recognized by the purchaser and the community
at large as owner. Some corrective measures would be needed.
The courts now claim to use the standard of a reasonable man
in determining whether the known facts should have created
a duty to make a thorough investigation. 8° That this standard,
coupled with the refusal to allow good faith under error of law,
can be very stringent has already been pointed out. The very
fact that a purchaser, though he may have known nothing to
raise a doubt about his vendor's title, did not make a title search
could be argued to be "that want of care which a prudent man
usually takes of his business." 3' Consistent with the presumption
30. Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 351, 123 So.2d 79, 83 (1960); Tyson v.

Spearman, 190 La. 871, 892, 183 So. 201, 208 (1938); Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So.2d
68, 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).

31. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 3556(13) (1870).
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of good faith, gross fault3 2 on the part of a possessor could be
required to preclude good faith. In any event, whether by judicial reappraisal or amendment of the Code, the scope of article
1846 should be limited so as to permit error of law on the part
of a possessor seeking to prescribe. There should be no change
in the policy of attributing to the client the mistakes of the
lawyer since any change in this policy would invite collusion.
If the other changes suggested were made, this latter policy
would lose a great deal of its importance.
The French Practice
That a system which permits error of law can work effectively is shown by the French practice. The articles of the French
Civil Code relative to ten- and twenty-year acquisitive prescription are very similar to those in our Code: good faith and just
title are required. 3 Article 3481 of our Code and article 2268
of the French Code are identical. Both hold that "good faith is
always presumed." From essentially the same legislation, absent
article 1846, the French jurisprudence has arrived at a very
different result. As in Louisiana, the possessor may not doubt
the title of his vendor and claim good faith.3 4 "But an acquirer
who made an erroneous judgment about the value of the documents produced by his grantor can rely on this error in justifying his good faith. '35 Both error of fact and law are considered
consistent with good faith.3 6 In keeping with article 2268, good
faith in France is held to be a question of fact to be decided
7
by the judge in each case, with good faith always presumed.
Because purchasers are not under such a strict duty to investigate
any possible defect in title and because error of law is permitted, the presumption is meaningful. Moreover, under the
32. Gross fault is defined by our code article 3556(13) as that fault "which
proceeds from inexcusable negligence or ignorance; it is considered as
nearly equal to fraud."
33. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 2265-2269.
34. 1 PLANIOL, TRAIT1I ]LEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 2667 (12th ed. 1939).
35. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN.AIS (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 218 (1966).
36. Id. See also 4 DALLOZ, ENCYCLOP9DIE JURIDIQUE § 41, at 11 (1st ed.
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1954), and 31 CARPENTIER ET Du SAINT, R]PARTOIRE GNERALE ALPHAB2TIQUE DU
DROIT FRANgAIS § 1543, at 294 (1903). As these sources point out, the older
French doctrine and jurisprudence held to the contrary. See 2 DELVINCOURT,
COURS DE CODE CwmL 656 (1834); 21 DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANgAIS 388
(1837); 2 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUg, DE LA PRESCRIPTION §§ 926, 927 (4th ed.

1857); Cass. 14 nov. 1887, S. 1888.1.473. The change occurred about at the
turn of the century. BAUDRY LACANTINERIE ET TISSIER, TRAITA DE DROIT CIVIL,
DE LA PRESCRIPTION § 680 (3d ed. 1905); Douai, 9 feb. 1909, S. 1910.2.44.
37. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA

STATE LAW

INSTITUTE) § 218 (1966).
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French jurisprudence, good faith requires only belief in the vendor's title. A purchaser can prescribe against defects (even those
of which he is aware) in the immediate transaction with his
vendor, provided the defects are not apparent on the face of the
instrument and do not render the transaction absolutely null.88
Conclusion
The practice of the Louisiana courts in distinguishing between moral and legal good faith is inconsistent with the spirit
and structure of the Code, and, while it simplifies the job of the
courts, it creates a difference between what the law requires
for good faith and what the average man means by good faith.
Such a difference between the law and the practice and understanding of the men whose affairs it regulates is not desirable.
M. Hampton Carver

TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAWAUTO COLLISIONS IN SMOKE, FOG, AND DUST
Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently found a plaintiff
automobile driver contributorily negligent as a matter of law,
irrespective of actual fault, if he is involved in a head-on collision while proceeding on the correct side of the road through
heavy fog, smoke, or dust. This Note will consider the application of the contributory negligence doctrine under such circumstances.'
Castille v. Richard2 was one of the first decisions in the
formulation of this policy. The parties collided head-on in a
heavy dust cloud raised by a car that had just overtaken the
defendant. The court pointed out that the road was very narrow
and that it was difficult for cars to avoid a collision even when
visibility was unobscured. It was impossible to tell which of the
38. 1 PLANIOL, TRAIT]P APLUMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 2667 (12th ed. 1939).
1. The same general rule of law is present in cases where a plaintiff,
proceeding through heavy smoke, fog, or dust, runs into the rear of a
vehicle negligently

stopped in

the

middle

of the

road. It

is

not within

the scope of this Note, however, to investigate the development of the rule
in those situations since it is based on the "assured clear distance" doctrine, which is not the same basis for the rule in the situations discussed
above. For an application of the "assured clear distance" rule in rear-end
collision cases, see, e.g., Rachal v. Batthazar, 32 So.2d 483 (La. App. 2d Cir.

1947); Giorlando v. Maitrejean, 22 So.2d 584 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945).
2. 157 La. 274, 102 So. 398 (1924).

